The House Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump issued 37 recommendations for the Secret Service, the Department of Homeland Security and Congress following reviews of the two assassination attempts directed toward the president-elect since July.

Trump was grazed by a bullet in a July 13 shooting at the Butler Farm Show grounds that killed Buffalo Township’s Corey Comperatore and injured two other rally attendees. Another attempt took place in West Palm Beach, Fla., on Sept. 15.

Below are the recommendations, 23 of which are directly related to the Butler County incident:

1. Consolidate all operations plans.

The Secret Service has the ultimate responsibility for securing the site for every protectee visit. The advance agents should therefore be aware of where every partner agency is posting personnel.

Moving forward, the Secret Service should request copies of the operations plans of all law enforcement entities working the event and consolidate the assigned posts for each of the participating entities.

For the July 13th event in Butler, the Secret Service advance agents did not have copies of all participating entities’ operations plans, nor did they have copies of the locations of each officer providing security.

2. Consider coverage inside and outside secured perimeter.

The Secret Service must maintain vigilance over state and local counterparts in ensuring the security of its protectees. As part of its zero fail mission, the Secret Service should assess and address all security concerns both inside and outside of any event perimeter.

While the Secret Service should consider support from local partners and their ability to secure areas surrounding an event, Secret Service must fully understand and verify the local assets available.

Regardless of a location within or outside of any particular perimeter, the Secret Service must own responsibility for the security of the site, filling any gaps with its own personnel in the event that local counterparts are unable to provide adequate security or to the extent heightened security concerns demand Secret Service presence.

3. Document all line of sight vulnerabilities.

Secret Service site agents must identify all potential lines of sight to the protectee which a trained sniper could reasonably be expected to utilize, state how such lines of sight will be mitigated, and ensure that a supervisor has approved the mitigation strategy for each.

The Secret Service CSTL must be given the opportunity to review the mitigation plan if countersnipers are utilized for an event, and the mitigation plan should be shared with state and local law enforcement no later than the final meeting prior to the arrival of the protectee.

4. Implement written policy that clearly articulates a threat-based methodology for asset and resource approval.

The nature of the campaign event in Butler, Pennsylvania on July 13, 2024 — outdoors, in front of a large crowd, with an active (redacted) from a (redacted), among other risk characteristics — should have necessitated a specific protocol of mitigation assets.

Instead, the Secret Service made ad hoc determinations as to the assets and manpower that were available to the planning team.

5. Utilize Secret Service countersurveillance assets for all large outdoor events.

The written policy should require countersurveillance assets for all large outdoor events.

Planners should not have to request those assets from Secret Service leadership, and should not be empowered to waive or decline to incorporate those assets into the operations plan for any large outdoor event.

6. Implement a policy on sharing relevant intelligence for an advance trip among the Protective Intelligence Division, the detail, and the relevant field office.

The list of individuals read into the threat intelligence should include working supervisors such as the field office SAIC, the protective intelligence agent, the Lead Advance Agent, and the Site Agent to ensure proper assets are requested and vulnerabilities are mitigated.

7. Improve Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems mitigation strategies for when Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems or other drone systems fail.

Secret Service should put in place policies and procedures for Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems asset failure contingencies, to include certain requirements such as: required testing of assets the day prior to an event; the possession of backup materials, Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems operators should be required to carry as well as bring certain additional back up materials and parts to events; creation of redundancies in the event of Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems asset failure; and implementing standardized troubleshooting procedures.

8. Implement and increase formalized training, certification, and cross-functional platform training for drone and Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems operators.

The Technology Security Division should implement a comprehensive, service-wide formal training and certification process for all drone and Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems technologies, including a standardized “Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems advance checklist.”

Additionally, cross-functional training should be established to enable any agent to assume a collateral duty as a drone or Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems operator if necessary.

This training should also include a contingencies portion, which not only includes a section on troubleshooting Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems assets, but also backup materials and items the Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems agent should keep on hand in the event of an emergency.

As part of the training program for Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems, operators should be required to participate in a program where they shadow another Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems agent from the beginning of the advance process through the event to ascertain on-the-job experience and to obtain firsthand knowledge of what the Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems process entails in a real-life scenario.

9. Ensure that drone and Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems operators assigned to events have passed and maintained required training and certification as well as any necessary updates.

Special agents must be familiar with the equipment they employ and be prepared to address last-minute or technical issues.

10. The Department of Homeland Security and Secret Service should consider utilizing Department of Defense drone operators to supplement Secret Service efforts at protectee events under the Presidential Protection Assistance Act.

(Redacted), deploying Department of Defense drone operators would free up other special agents for protectee duties, alleviate manpower strain, and enhance the effectiveness of surveillance operations.

11. Congress should consider whether current legal authorities to mitigate credible threats posed by Unmanned Aircraft Systems should be expanded.

The rapid expansion of the commercial Unmanned Aircraft Systems market has increased the threat of drone incursions at protectee events.

Congress should consider legislative proposals that would responsibly extend and justifiably expand legal authorities to respond to credible threats all the while balanced by appropriate safeguards to protect Americans’ privacy, ensure aviation security, and allow for authorized commercial activity.

For instance, Congress should consider authorizing Department of Homeland Security to establish a Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems mitigation pilot program under which selected state and covered local law enforcement agencies may operate approved Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems mitigation systems and mitigate unauthorized Unmanned Aircraft Systems operations on behalf of covered entities within their jurisdictions.

12. The Secret Service needs to make every effort to ensure representatives from all state and local law enforcement agencies assisting with security for a protectee event are in a unified security room.

While the OPO-08 policy update (in the Protective Operations policy manual) is a step in the right direction, a unified security room helps ensure real-time information sharing among all security partners.

13. The Secret Service should ensure that all state and local law enforcement partners have a communications plan in place for protectee events and a Secret Service special agent should be designated to collect and review those plans.

This will help ensure communications between command post personnel and every law enforcement entity at the event.

14. Secret Service should ensure that its personnel and its state and local partners all establish a hierarchy for method of communication and each entity alert its Law Enforcement Officers when switching to a different medium.

Generally, radios and government-issued devices should be used, with personal devices as a last resort. Also, it is helpful for state and local law enforcement radios to have interoperability to be able to listen to other channels.

15. To assist with any potential reviews and investigations, Secret Service should record all Secret Service radio communications.

Secret Service should record its radio communications and preserve any written communications while prohibiting the use of encrypted messages apps (e.g., Signal) that do not preserve data.

Given how video footage helps with providing clarity to the public, Secret Service should make it a best practice for post standers to use body-worn-cameras during events.

16. Secret Service should assess already-available technology and examine ways to utilize it to improve their operations.

17. Prioritize periodic training on protective operations in order to ensure that agents stay current on their training, even during busy times.

Many agents testified that when operational tempo is high, training often becomes a casualty.

18. Provide more defined training curriculum and set specific requirements and timeframes for regular training.

Many agents testified that they do not have set ongoing training standards.

19. Work with HSI to ensure that HSI agents that participate in Secret Service-led protective operations receive training that is appropriate to the tasks that they are asked to support.

20. Confirm key points of contact.

Early in the planning process, the Secret Service advance team needs to confirm the primary representative for each state and local law enforcement agency and which agencies will be working jointly and independently drafting operations plans.

21. Provide a unified briefing on the day of the event.

The Secret Service needs to provide a unified briefing either the day of a protectee visit or the day before, which includes at least one representative from all state and local law enforcement agencies assisting with an event.

Doing so will help eliminate gaps in situational awareness and ensure critical information is shared more broadly.

22. Conduct mandatory pre-event meetings for key stakeholders on a daily basis.

Secret Service should also consider mandating daily “check-in” meetings in the days immediately before an event for all relevant state and local counterparts involved in event security.

23. Secret Service must affirmatively state which Secret Service office or protective detail is the lead for an event.

This designation should be based on the event location, available resources, protectee threat assessment, and overall risk profile of an event.

The protective detail and local field office should undoubtedly work together to complement each other’s strengths — the local field office may be better acquainted with a site and have relationships with local law enforcement while a detail has insight into the protectee’s expectations — but the Secret Service must designate and document the single lead entity and reporting lines for an event.

24. Implement a (redacted) vehicle for use on a golf course.

Although not presently utilized, the Secret Service should consider the use of a (redacted) vehicle or golf cart.

25. Review protocols for sweeping golf courses.

The Secret Service should review its protocols for (redacted) golf outings (redacted). The Secret Service should consider: the utility of regularly utilizing a UAV for reconnaissance in such sparsely occupied open areas and analyze additional reliable, rapidly deployable, and/or mobile technologies that could further be used to supplement manpower for coverage of large open areas.

26. Increase reliance on K-9 sweeps.

K-9 sweeps should be considered as practical, particularly in view of the Secret Service’s robot K-9 asset, which does not have the same practical limitations as a K-9 with heat and other sensitivity.

27. Record all radio transmissions and evaluate communications retention policies

The Secret Service should record its radio transmissions for all protective events and should consider its overall approach to records retention, including maintaining SMS and email communications.

On July 13, the Secret Service did not record its radio communications. The absence of radio logs or recordings significantly limits the ability to reconstruct events for either investigative or evaluative purposes.

Acting Director Rowe testified to directing the Secret Service to record radio transmissions for such events going forward, but the agency’s updated policies still condition radio recording for presidential nominee and certain other protectee events on staffing and equipment availability.

To the extent that there are any technological limitations that prevent radio recordings or logs for all protective events, the Secret Service must prioritize addressing those challenges to enable this capability.

28. Consider staffing redundancies for high pressure moments

The Secret Service may consider additional staffing or flex posts to increase adaptability to evolving situations, but at the core of this recommendation is the suggestion to develop its contingency planning, particularly in chaotic and emergency situations, to ensure that personnel are available to respond to all communications and actions.

The Task Force identified multiple instances in which Secret Service personnel reported they could not perform one function while attending to another urgent need. The agency should reassess its staffing of critical posts such as the Command Post or Security Room agent and countersniper teams, which may be more likely to have competing demands during critical response periods.

Further, the number of roving posts such as CS Response, Site PI, and Relief agents should match the demands of an event site.

The demands of an event situated on a 100-acre property with an anticipated 15,000 attendees well exceeded the capacity of only three agents, each with unique roles that state and local counterparts could augment but not replace.

29. Develop and formalize process for escalating conflicts with protectee staff.

The Secret Service should implement a formal process by which personnel may raise concerns in their planning with protectee staff.

Over the course of our investigation, several members of the Secret Service expressed frustrations in negotiating with staff, regardless of political party or protectee.

Ultimately the Secret Service is responsible for protectee security, but the agency may find itself working with staff who assert competing interests such as scheduling and optics.

A formal process by which personnel may raise concerns in their dealings with protectee staff will empower agents to raise those issues to supervisors and leave Secret Service with a record of the dispute to evaluate should further issues arise. Any such documentation should be considered confidential and should be exempt from any public disclosure requests.

30. Provide more robust training for non-Secret Service federal personnel on-site.

When assigned to Secret Service protective missions, non-USSS federal personnel have the same zero-fail mission as Secret Service personnel — to protect the protectee. Department of Homeland Security supported former President Donald Trump’s July 13 event by providing HSI agents, but Secret Service personnel testified to the Task Force that these agents — and HSI agents generally — can be challenging to manage because “you're having to explain the posts a lot more and you don't know whether they even have worked with us before.”

The Task Force obtained testimony that for July 13, HSI agents allegedly received “a 1-hour PowerPoint or something like that,” and that the Secret Service would otherwise only provide the morning briefing and the relevant paperwork on the day of an event.

While the Task Force did not observe critical HSI agent failures on July 13 during the course of its investigation, the Secret Service failures that day demonstrate that trainings and preparations for non-Secret Service federal personnel must be strengthened and more robust for protective missions.

31. Prioritize experience in assignment process.

Secret Service personnel must have an avenue to gain experience in protection details and in particular to be able to fulfill their responsibilities in advanced planning assignments.

To develop that expertise, Secret Service should allow less-experienced personnel to participate in advance planning. However, high-risk protection events are not an appropriate setting for less experienced agents to gain on-the-job training in leadership roles.

For high-risk events, such as the July 13 campaign event in Butler — an event that was outdoors, drew a large crowd, and featured one of the most prominent protectees — only agents with experience in advance planning should be assigned leading roles.

32. In-person advance activities must include all relevant subject matter experts.

The Secret Service cites the strain on headcount and the heightened pace of the campaign season for not having all advance agents on the ground for the entire advance, with one aspect of work — the CAT advance — being performed over the phone.

While the Task Force did not identify failures of the CAT advance team for this particular event, Secret Service should — and indeed already has — addressed the unnecessary risk of tactical advance agents not being on the ground to scope sites.

All substantive advance decisions that require viewing the site should be made by somebody who has assessed the location in person.

33. Review Secret Service budget, staffing, and retention.

Financial and personnel resources should never stand in the way of the Secret Service carrying out their critical protective mission.

To the extent additional funding is needed, especially for technology and modernization, Congress, Department of Homeland Security, and the Secret Service should explore how to best achieve this end. Staying on the cutting edge of innovation is an especially critical priority given the events of July 13.

However, the Secret Service must also consider ways to increase experienced personnel via both hiring and retention. The Secret Service and Congress should therefore look to identify approaches to make employment more sustainable and rewarding, both personally and professionally.

Based upon the Task Force’s investigation, particular areas of note include reducing the pace of travel, ensuring overtime is properly compensated, and giving incentives for veteran agents to stay with the Secret Service beyond minimum retirement ages.

34. Reduce the number of protectees.

The number of individuals being protected has greatly expanded, a resource demand which becomes further taxed during the longer and more intensive modern presidential campaign seasons.

Additionally, because the Secret Service protects foreign dignitaries, there is a significant increase in work during the U.N. General Assembly, which occurs in September at the height of campaign season.

As a result, Congress, Department of Homeland Security, and the Secret Service should jointly consider the protective role the Secret Service plays for foreign leaders and consider whether such duties can be transferred or abrogated in order to focus on the Secret Service’s primary duty: to protect the President and other critical U.S. leaders.

35. Congress and the Secretary of Homeland Security should review the Secret Service’s investigative role.

Since the Secret Service’s inception, its mission has evolved to include both protective and investigative functions, including specific priorities involving fraud, financial crimes, and cybercrimes.

These non-protective, investigative functions require systemic review because of the Secret Service’s stunning failure to protect President-elect Trump on July 13.

While the Task Force recognizes the importance and past successes of Secret Service investigations, it recommends Department of Homeland Security and Secret Service explore policies and practices that would minimize the volume of Secret Service investigative work during campaign seasons in order to prioritize the protection of U.S. leaders and candidates running for office.

The Secret Service’s protective mission is at the core of the agency’s purpose — anything that distracts or diverts resources from the agency’s zero-fail mission must be reconsidered.

Accordingly, Congress, Department of Homeland Security, and the Secret Service should each consider the feasibility of permanently moving or temporarily moving Secret Service investigative functions to a different federal agency within or outside of Department of Homeland Security.

36. Evaluate whether Secret Service should remain inside the Department of Homeland Security.

In 2003, Secret Service moved from its long-standing place organizationally housed inside the Department of the Treasury into the newly formed Department of Homeland Security.

For the last decade, Secret Service’s budget has represented only around 3% of its parent organization’s budget of over $100 billion. Department of Homeland Security contains six component agencies larger that Secret Service — the largest, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) — has a budget 10 times larger than that of Secret Service. Over this period of time, Secret Service has not benefited from stable leadership. It has had seven different directors since 2014 and only one who lasted three years on the job.

The current structure potentially weakens Secret Service, a small but critically important agency, in advocating for its budget and other priorities inside a much larger entity. The failure in Butler was far from the first significant Secret Service failure in recent history, and it is fair to question whether Secret Service should continue to be housed within Department of Homeland Security.

We suggest that the House Committee on Homeland Security should examine the pluses and minuses of Secret Service’s position housed inside Department of Homeland Security.

A fresh look at whether Secret Service might benefit from the status of an independent agency, with more freedom to make budget requests and advocate for itself, would be a healthy discussion for former Secret Service leaders to have with Congress.

37. Congress should clarify its right to obtain law enforcement sensitive information.

Congress regularly finds itself engaged in disputes with the Department of Justice over information relating to law enforcement investigations.

With respect to the assassination attempt in Butler, the Task Force’s requests for information were characterized by the FBI as implicating “significant law enforcement sensitivities,” and subsequent FBI disclosures were labeled as “extraordinary accommodation[s] unique to this matter.”

With respect to the assassination attempt in Florida, where the gunman was apprehended alive and awaits a likely prosecution, the FBI provided no documents in response to the Task Force’s request and provided only a single status briefing on Sept. 25, 2024.

The Department of Justice undoubtedly has an interest in preserving the integrity of its criminal investigations, and the Task Force appreciates the FBI’s willingness to provide the Task Force with timely access to certain evidence gathered in the agency’s ongoing Butler investigation.

Still, the attempt on the former president’s life in Florida is a matter in which the House and the nation as a whole have such a pronounced interest in not only understanding the facts and circumstances, but also in ensuring that Congress has adequate information to develop informed legislative proposals intended to decrease the likelihood of similar security failures from occurring in the future.

Whether rooted in generalized “law enforcement sensitivities” or an indefinite “law enforcement privilege” that stems from the common law, the phrase “ongoing investigation” should not be treated as a magical incantation that disables Congress’ otherwise broad right of access to relevant information necessary for it to carry out its constitutional functions.

The House may consider — through either legislation, chamber rule, or committee rule as deemed appropriate — reaffirming its own views on the scope of a committee’s right of access to information pertaining to an ongoing investigation held by a law enforcement agency, and/or establishing principles to help guide the accommodations process in the case of a dispute.