There should be broad public support for efforts in Congress to update rules related to pilot fatigue. The issue drew national attention when Continental Flight 3407 crashed Feb. 12 near Buffalo, N.Y., amid challenging winter flying conditions not uncommon on northern flights.

Soon after the crash that killed 50 people, it was revealed that the pilot had commuted to his base airport in Newark, N.J., from his home in Florida the night before. And, the co-pilot had commuted to Newark from her home in Seattle the night before. She also was complaining about not feeling well during the ill-fated flight from New Jersey to Buffalo.

Additional details about the Buffalo crash also raised issues of pilot training when it was learned that the pilot had failed several hands-on flight exams before finally being certified to fly the commuter jet for Colgan Air. Flight recorders recovered after the crash also picked up a conversation between the pilot and co-pilot in which both expressed anxiety about icing conditions and winter flying in the north.

The issues of low pay, long hours and the long commutes endured by many pilots, especially those flying for commuter airlines, also have been the subject of congressional hearings. But fatigue, which is a safety issue for commercial drivers as well as pilots, deserves renewed attention from Congress and federal regulators.

This week, a committee including airline officials and members of the pilots union is expected to issue a report recommending changes to rules regulating the hours a pilot can fly. Those rules have not been updated since the time when commercial airliners were powered by propellers, rather than jet engines.

Numerous studies have found that fatigue can impair a pilot's judgment and slow reaction time in much the same way as alcohol impairment. This new appreciation for the dangers created by tired pilots should lead to new rules. It should be no more acceptable to say "the pilot's just a little tired" than it would be to say "the pilot's just a little drunk."

The last attempt to update rules regulating flight hours and rest hours for pilots was in the 1990s. At that time, the airline industry wanted, quite reasonably, to roll back salaries somewhat or make other contract changes to reflect fewer hours worked at the controls of an airliner, but union officials rejected those concessions.

One issue that must be considered is the different demands placed on pilots for major carriers and the smaller regional airlines. It's generally true that regional pilots, flying short-haul trips, often are performing six or eight takeoffs and landings in the same eight hours it takes a pilot with a major carrier to fly across the country or to Europe, with just one takeoff and landing. The added demands of multiple short flights should be taken into account when developing new rules to ensure that all commercial pilots are well rested.

Some airline crashes are blamed on "pilot error." But while human beings do make mistakes, Congress and the Federal Aviation Administration should ensure that all commercial pilots are well-rested and operating at their highest skill level, especially when emergency circumstances require extraordinary reactions.

Though it can never be known with certainty, it appears likely that fatigue played a role in the Continental pilot in the Buffalo crash reacting in exactly the wrong way when his plane's stall warning sounded. He pulled back on the controls, rather than pushing forward to drop the nose of the plane and gain speed to avoid a dangerous stall situation. It is possible that had he and his co-pilot been better rested and more alert, they would have reacted correctly and 50 lives would have been spared.

A number of other airline crashes also have pointed to pilot fatigue as a key factor.

Congress should press ahead with updating rules governing pilots flying for regional as well as major airlines. The flying public deserves the safety improvements that come with updating rules and regulations based on the latest scientific evidence and evaluations of airline crashes — especially those that were avoidable.