Six years ago this month, Saudi operatives murdered and dismembered U.S.-resident Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi under direct orders from de facto Saudi leader Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS). The crime was so brutal and so shocking that for a brief period, even politicians and business leaders who had long profited from looking the other way at Riyadh’s misdeeds were calling for a reevaluation of the U.S.-Saudi relationship.

The devastating U.S.-backed Saudi war in Yemen received greater attention in the wake of the Khashoggi murder, and Congress voted down a proposed bomb sale to Saudi Arabia, only to be reversed by a Donald Trump veto. On the campaign trail, candidate Joe Biden called the Saudi regime a “pariah,” and shortly after taking office he pledged to stop selling the kingdom offensive weapons it could utilize in its brutal war on Yemen.

Six years later, all appears to be forgiven, at least in official Washington. The Biden administration has pursued an expansion of the Trump-inspired Abraham Accords to include Saudi Arabia. The accords were a vehicle for persuading Arab states like the UAE and Morocco to normalize relations with Israel in exchange for stepped up U.S. arms and political support. The plight of the Palestinians was an afterthought, with vague noises about addressing the issue of the Israeli occupation at some future date.

The Abraham Accords were a bad bargain when Trump son-in-law Jared Kushner initiated them, and they’re a bad deal now. Saudi participation appears to be stalled for the moment over the issue of Israel’s ongoing war crimes in Gaza, but expect its boosters to resume their pursuit of that goal at some future point. And it’s important to remember part of the deal would be a “security commitment” that could commit the United States to defend the reckless, destabilizing regime of MBS by force — the last thing we need in a world already at war.

The pursuit of closer ties with Saudi Arabia has been followed by the recent designation of the UAE as a “major defense partner” of the United States, on the grounds it will be a force for stability in a troubled region. But there is no evidence the UAE has any interest in playing that role.

From partnering with Saudi Arabia in its brutal war on Yemen, to intervening with arms and drone attacks in civil wars in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Libya, the UAE regime has shown more interest in bolstering its power and access in the Middle East and North Africa than it has in cooling tensions or promoting stability. Strengthening military ties between the U.S. and the UAE is an unforced error that could augur more, not less conflict in the Middle East.

The next administration needs to rethink and recalibrate U.S. relations with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, focusing more on economic relationships and less on selling arms. This path could have been pursued as part of President Joe Biden’s stated support for a battle between democracies and autocracies, but misguided short-term thinking and an addiction to old ways of doing business got in the way.

Advocates of enhancing cooperation with the regime of MBS have portrayed themselves as hard headed realists who understand human rights cannot be the primary guide to U.S. policy in a tough neighborhood where it is in desperate need of allies. But the advocates of embracing Saudi Arabia and the UAE are the ones who are truly naive, assuming these regimes will depart from their recent histories when there is no evidence that will be the case. Historical amnesia is a terrible guide for U.S. foreign policy, and the entire U.S. strategy toward the Gulf states is in desperate need of reform.

William D. Hartung is a senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.